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A B S T R A C T
Two hospitals compete for the exclusive services of health professionals, who are privately informed about
their ability and motivation. Hospitals differ in their ownership structure and in the mission they pursue.
The non-profit hospital sacrifices some profits to follow its mission but becomes attractive for moti-
vated workers. In equilibrium, when both hospitals are active, the sorting of workers to hospitals is efficient
and ability-neutral. Allocative distortions are decreasing in the degree of competition and disappear when
hospitals are similar. The non-profit hospital tends to provide a higher amount of care and offer lower
salaries than the for-profit one.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A characteristic feature of the health care industry is that non-
profit hospitals coexist with for-profit ones. For example, Nolte et al.
(2014) report that the proportions of non-profit and for-profit hos-
pitals are, respectively, 58% and 21% in the United States and, as for
Europe, 29% and 39% in France or 36% and 35% in Germany. In Italy,
about 22% of hospitals are non-profit while 39% are for-profit (see
Barros and Siciliani, 2012).
There exists both theoretical and empirical literature studying
the relationship between hospitals’ ownership structure and either
quality provision or workers’ remuneration.
As for differences in quality provision, the theoretical literature
seems to agree on the fact that non-profit firms provide higher
quality than their for-profit counterparts, although for different
reasons. More specifically, Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) and Hansmann
(1996) show that the non-profit status serves as a commitment
device to provide softer incentives, which translate into an im-
provement of the quality of the product sold; Lakdawalla and
Philipson (2006) and Malani et al. (2003) assume instead that
non-profit firms are altruistic and have a preference for quality.1
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence on quality differentials is es-
sentially mixed (see Sloan, 2000).
As for wage differentials, lower average wages in non-profit firms
relative to for-profits have been documented in a number of em-
pirical analyses.2 Theoretically, the “donative labour hypothesis” has
been proposed as the source of wage penalties in non-profit firms:
workers are intrinsically motivated for being employed at non-
profit firms and thus enjoy some non-monetary benefits whichmake
them willing to accept lower wages.3 However, wage differentials
might also arise because of a selection bias, given that wage gaps
can also reflect unobservable differences in workers’ ability across
firms or sectors. Therefore, when neither workers’ productivity nor
motivation is observable, it becomes important to disentangle the
pure compensating wage differential à la Rosen (1986), which might
be due to motivation, from the selection effect of ability.
We build a theoretical model that sheds light on the relation-
ship between hospitals’ ownership structure and both performance
(in terms of amount and, possibly, quality of care provided) andwage
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1 There are just two recent exceptions, namely Brekke et al. (2011, 2012).
2 See Hwang et al. (1992), Gibbons and Katz (1992), and Roomkin and Weisbrod
(1999) for hospitals or Jones (2015) for nursing homes.
3 This idea has been fostered by Preston (1989), by Heyes (2005) for nurses, and
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differentials. In particular, we focus on the sorting of health pro-
fessionals to a non-profit and a for-profit hospital; we consider the
design of optimal incentive schemes when physicians and nurses
are privately informed about their skills and their intrinsic moti-
vation, with both characteristics being discretely distributed and
taking two possible values each.
All health professionals experience a cost from exerting effort,
which differs across workers’ types (being it negatively related to
workers’ ability), but which does not depend on the status of the
hospital. Conversely, intrinsic motivation onlymatters whenworkers
are hired by the non-profit hospital. In our view, one of the main
distinguishing features of non-profit hospitals is that they provide
a substantial amount of free treatment for poor and uninsured
patients.4 Charity care is valuable for some health professionals, pre-
cisely those who are not onlymoved by standard extrinsic incentives,
but are also characterized by non-pecuniary motivations. More pre-
cisely, when motivated workers are employed by the non-profit
hospital, they receive a vocational premium because they benefit,
to a certain extent, from their personal contribution to the mission
or the performance of their organization.5
Thus, on the one hand, the non-profit hospital has a competi-
tive advantage with respect to the for-profit provider because the
former can employ motivated health professionals, who exert more
effort and provide a higher amount of care relative to non-motivated
workers. On the other hand, being non-profit implies that the hos-
pital bears more costs because it must renounce to part of its
revenues in the form of charity care and other contributions to the
local community. Then, the for-profit hospital also has a competi-
tive advantagewith respect to the non-profit rival because the former
can fully appropriate its revenues and is not profit constrained.
The two hospitals simultaneously offer screening contracts
defined by a task level (the observable effort) and a non-linear wage
rate that depends on effort. Because of the strategic interaction
between the two hospitals, the workers’ outside options are type-
dependent and endogenous and thus the analysis of a multi-
principal framework with bidimensional screening is called for.
When the competitive advantage of the for-profit hospital domi-
nates, only the for-profit hospital is active, but the threat of entry
by the non-profit hospital reduces or even eliminates allocative in-
efficiencies caused by asymmetric information.
When both hospitals are active at equilibrium, health profes-
sionals sort themselves by motivation: motivated workers choose
to be employed by the non-profit hospital, whereas non-motivated
workers are hired by the for-profit hospital. Hence, workers’ self-
selection is ability-neutral and it is efficient.
Optimal allocations (i.e. effort levels or amount of care) are de-
termined according to the degree of competition between hospitals.
The latter influences the importance of workers’ outside opportu-
nities (i.e. a worker’s threat of accepting the contract offered by
the rival hospital) vis-à-vis workers’ informational advantages (i.e.
a worker’s threat of pretending to be of a different type and ac-
cepting the contract offered by the same hospital to a different type)
in the hospitals’ screening contracts. In particular, if competition
is harsh because hospitals are similar as to revenue appropriation,
and workers’ motivation is not significant, then outside options
dominate incentive compatibility and screening contracts resem-
ble the ones arising with duopolistic competition under full
information. Thus, effort levels are set at the first-best by both hos-
pitals and allocative distortions do not exist. If, instead, competition
is mild, because the non-profit firm is truly profit constrained and
workers’ motivation is relevant, then internal incentive compati-
bility is the driving force shaping optimal contracts. Then, downward
distortions emerge in optimal allocations, which coincide with those
observed under monopsony and (bidimensional) asymmetric in-
formation. In a nutshell, the ‘no distortion at the top’ property holds
for high-ability health professionals, whereas allocative distor-
tions for low-ability types are higher the lower the degree of
competition between the two hospitals. Moreover, given ability,
effort levels are almost always higher for health professional em-
ployed at the non-profit hospital than for workers employed at
the for-profit hospital. Thus, interpreting effort as quality-enhancing
effort, our model predicts higher quality provision by non-profit
rather than for-profit hospitals, in line with most of the theoreti-
cal literature.
As for non-linear wages, we find that, when the competitive ad-
vantage of the for-profit hospital is sufficiently high with respect
to the competitive advantage of the non-profit hospital, a wage
penalty emerges. Indeed, given ability, the salary gained by health
professionals employed at the non-profit hospital is lower than the
salary offered by the for-profit hospital. The wage penalty for mo-
tivated health professionals is always associated with higher effort
provision and thus better performance by the non-profit hospital.
Given that sorting is ability-neutral and that workers’ average ability
is the same across hospitals (a consequence of the independent dis-
tribution of skills and motivation), the earnings penalty possibly
experienced by non-profit motivated workers is due to a true com-
pensatingwage differential and is not driven by the negative selection
with respect to ability. Finally, the wage gap is increasing in ability,
which implies that the non-profit hospital offers its employees lower
returns to ability than the for-profit provider.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following
subsection, we describe the related literature. In Section 2, we set
up the model. Section 3 presents, as benchmark cases, the first-
best and the equilibrium with perfectly informed competing
hospitals. Subsection 3.3 introduces asymmetric information and
describes the optimal screening contracts offered by the for-profit
hospital when it deters entry of the non-profit rival. In Section 4,
we focus on competition between hospitals under bidimensional
screening, and consider the equilibrium sorting of workers to hos-
pitals. In Subsection 4.3, the full characterization of optimal contracts
is provided, when ability and motivation are uniformly distrib-
uted. Section 5 comments on the impact that hospitals’ ownership
structure has on quality of care and on workers’ salaries. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
1.1. Related literature
Our work contributes to two different strands of literature. From
the point of view of health economics, it adds both to the litera-
ture studying the design of optimal incentive schemes for health
professionals and to the literature dealing with the issue of com-
petition among hospitals (possibly characterized by different
ownership structures). From a technical point of view, it explicitly
solves a multi-principal game in a market where two firms compete
to attract agents characterized by two different dimensions of private
information.
In the health economics literature, the paper is related to those
works analyzing incentive schemes for health providers. Ma (1994)
4 In exchange for sizeable tax exemptions, non-profit hospitals in the U.S. must
engage in activities that meet the Internal Revenue Service’s community benefit stan-
dard. The provision of charity care helps meet that standard. The mean proportion
of total operating expenses spent on charity care by non-profit hospitals in Califor-
nia during 2011–2013 is 1.9%, with about 4% of non-profit hospitals devoting 5% or
more of their operating expenses to charity care (see Valdovinos et al., 2015). In Texas,
there exists a lower bound to the percentage of charity care to be provided by non-
profit hospitals, which must dedicate at least 4% of net patient revenue to the poor.
5 As an example, consider the mission statement of Kaiser Permanente, the fourth
largest non-profit hospital system in the U.S. (according to 2015 data from the Amer-
ican Hospital Directory): “Improving health care access for those with limited incomes
and resources is Kaiser Permanente’s mission. Our Medical Financial Assistance pro-
gramme helps low-income, uninsured, and underserved patients receive access to
care.” (See http://share.kaiserpermanente.org).
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studies the optimal regulation of a provider that chooses both
effort aimed at quality enhancement and effort aimed at cost
containment, when the purchaser observes the provider’s costs of
treating patients. Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) consider a
richer environment where quality is multidimensional, costs are
not observable and treating all patients is inefficient. More re-
cently, the literature has studied altruistic providers, who are
concerned with their patients’ health status and who choose the
quality of their services. In Jack (2005), the provider is character-
ized by private information about his level of altruism, whereas,
in Choné and Ma (2011), the physician also has private informa-
tion about the health status of the patient. In both papers, the
principal uses a screening mechanism based only on the provi-
der’s altruism. The design of screening contracts when health
providers are privately informed about their ability while their
altruism is common knowledge and homogeneous is the subject
of Makris (2009) and Makris and Siciliani (2013). Makris and
Siciliani (2014) extend the analysis to account for unobserved
heterogeneity about both motivation and productivity of provid-
ers, but they restrict attention to linear incentive schemes.
Another strand of the health economics literature studies com-
petition between altruistic providers under full information. Among
others, Brekke et al. (2011, 2012) consider the effect of competi-
tion between altruistic providers on quality of services in a spatial
competition framework. The paper more closely related to ours is
Brekke et al. (2012), where two altruistic providers/hospitals compete
in quality to attract patients. Our paper is different because besides
introducing asymmetric information, it focuses on hospitals com-
peting to attract health professionals instead of patients. To the best
of our knowledge, our paper is the first to address the issue of het-
erogeneous providers competing for heterogeneous health
professionals (under bidimensional adverse selection), thus study-
ing both non-linear incentive schemes and competition in a unified
framework.
From a technical point of view, our paper draws both from the
literature on multidimensional screening and from the literature on
multi-principals. Models where both problems are simultane-
ously considered are very few and tend to rely on simplifying
assumptions.
Screening when agents have several unobservable characteris-
tics and types distributions are continuous has been analyzed by
Armstrong (1996), Basov (2005), and Rochet and Choné (1998),
among others. Our model is characterized by a discrete type
space, and by one screening instrument available to the principal
(namely the contractible effort level) so that the closest paper to
ours is Armstrong (1999), which considers optimal price regula-
tion of a monopoly that is privately informed about its cost and
demand. Smart (2000) solves a bidimensional screening problem
in a perfectly competitive insurance market in which customers
differ with respect to both accident probability and risk aversion.
More recently, Olivella and Schroyen (2014) have studied a mo-
nopolistic insurance company selling contracts to individuals who
differ in their risks and risk aversion. Finally, Barigozzi and Burani
(2016) consider the screening problem of a mission-oriented
monopsonist willing to hire workers of unknown ability and
motivation. The present paper adds the important dimension of
competition between two differentiated firms.
In the multi-principal literature, the paper that is most closely
related to ours is Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1993), which studies
two heterogeneous principals competing for the exclusive ser-
vices of an agent in the presence of both adverse selection and
moral hazard. Another related article is Armstrong and Vickers
(2001) that examines price discrimination in an oligopolistic frame-
work by modelling firms as competing directly in utility space. In
a similar vein, Rochet and Stole (2002) study duopolists compet-
ing in nonlinear prices when consumers are heterogeneous
and privately informed about preferences for quality and outside
opportunities.6
Our paper is also related to the recent literature on self-selection
of motivated workers into different firms/sectors of the labour
market. Delfgaauw and Dur (2007), Handy and Katz (1998) and
Heyes (2005) are the first papers claiming that low wages are nec-
essary to select workers characterized by highmotivation.7 Delfgaauw
and Dur (2008, 2010) consider workers characterized by different
productivity and motivation self-selecting into the public and the
private sector. In Delfgaauw and Dur (2010), both sectors are per-
fectly competitive and workers’ attributes are perfectly observable.
In Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), instead, workers’ attributes are private
information and the screening problem of the governmental agency
is tackled, although in a simplified way. We depart from these works
becausewe consider strategic interaction between firms under asym-
metric information and non-linear contracting.8
2. The model
Two hospitals (principals) compete to hire physicians or nurses
(agents). Each health professional (she) can work exclusively for one
principal (he).9 Hospitals and health professionals are risk neutral.
From a technical point of view, we study a multi-principal setting
with bidimensional adverse selection.
Medical care supplied by health professionals is the only input
the two hospitals need to treat patients. We call e the observable
and measurable quantity of care or treatment that the worker is
asked to provide, or, more generally, her exerted effort. Both hos-
pitals have the same technology, which displays constant returns
to treatment provision, in such a way that the number of diagno-
sis and procedures or, equivalently, the number of patients treated
is given by
q e e( ) = .
As an alternative interpretation, e is effort exerted by a health
professional to enhance the quality of care. Thus, with a slight abuse
of terminology and notation, e can represent the quality of care at
each hospital, as in Ma (1994). Accordingly, higher quality attracts
a higher number of patients, which increases hospitals’ revenues.10
6 In both papers, outside options only affect the consumers’ participation deci-
sions but not their incentives to reveal information. In our setup, instead, bothworkers’
characteristics influence both participation and incentive constraints, so that the single-
crossing condition does not hold. As a consequence, while those papers show that
an equilibrium outcome always consists in firms offering efficient two-part tariffs,
we find that departures from efficiency often emerge.
7 Barigozzi et al. (2014) and Barigozzi and Turati (2012) consider labour supply
in a market where the wage rate is flat and where workers have private informa-
tion about both productive ability and motivation, that follow a general joint
distribution.
8 The matching of workers to firms with different missions and the design of
optimal incentive schemes for intrinsically motivated workers have been analyzed
by Besley and Ghatak (2005) in a moral-hazard framework. Moreover, Kosfeld and
von Siemens (2011) model a competitive labour market with team production and
adverse selection, where selfish and conditionally cooperative workers exist. They
show that workers separate in equilibrium, thereby leading to the emergence of het-
erogeneous “corporate cultures,” like for-profit and non-profit. Finally, DeVaro et al.
(2015) consider a non-profit firm that competes with perfectly competitive for-
profit rivals in hiring workers who differ in skills and derive intrinsic motivation from
the non-profit social mission. The non-profit firm faces a non-distribution con-
straint and, differently from our model, is bound to offer flat wages to its employees.
9 In our context with two hospitals that only differ in terms of ownership struc-
ture, common agency (i.e. a setting where relationships are not exclusive) is less
appropriate. The related phenomenon of “moonlighting,” occurring when public-
service physicians may refer patients to their private practices, has been analyzed
by Biglaiser and Ma (2007).
10 We will revert to this interpretation in Section 5.1, when we will compare our
results with those of the theoretical and empirical literature relating quality to hos-
pitals’ organizational form.
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Every hospital is paid a fixed tariff for every patient admitted
for treatment, as in Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) systems, like
Medicare in the U.S. or prospective payment systems in many Eu-
ropean countries. Therefore, the hospital’s profit from hiring a single
worker is given by
π H H He w pk q e w k e w, ,( ) = ( ) − = −
where the superscript H FP NP∈{ }, denotes the organizational form
of the hospital, with FP referring to the for-profit hospital and NP
referring to the non-profit hospital; the DRG tariff is equal for both
hospitals, exogenous, and set at p = 1, andw is the total wage or salary
paid to the health professional hired by the hospital. The parame-
ter kH represents the impact of the hospital’s ownership structure
on revenues. We assume that k kFP NP> because the for-profit hos-
pital is able to fully appropriate its revenues, whereas the non-
profit hospital devotes a fraction of its revenues to charity care. For
simplicity, we set k kFP ≡ >1 and kNP =1.11 Therefore k captures the
competitive advantage of the for-profit hospital relative to the non-
profit provider in terms of revenue appropriation.12 But, as we explain
below, being non-profit also comes with a competitive advantage:
the non-profit hospital is able to attract motivated workers and ben-
efits from their labour donations.
Suppose that a unit-mass population of health professionals differ
in two characteristics, ability and intrinsic motivation, which are
independently distributed and can take two values each. To make
notation less cumbersome, we use upper-case letters to denote high
(good) values of workers’ characteristics and lower-case letters to
denote low (bad) values.
A health professional characterized by high ability incurs in a
low cost of providing a given effort level. Ability is denoted by
θ θ θi A a∈{ }, where θa > θA. A fraction ν of workers has high ability
(i.e. a low cost of effort) θA, the fraction 1 − ν is instead character-
ized by low ability (i.e. a high cost of effort) θa. Ability is the only
relevant workers’ characteristic for the for-profit hospital. Health
professionals, to a certain extent, derive utility from exerting effort
or providing treatment at the non-profit hospital. Indeed, only when
employed by the non-profit hospital, can motivated workers supply
care to poor and uninsured patients.13 Thus, ability and motiva-
tion are both relevant for the non-profit hospital. Paralleling ability,
we assume that motivation takes two possible values γ γ γj m M∈{ }, ,
with γM > γm. A fraction μ of workers is characterized by high
motivation γM, whereas the fraction 1 − μ has instead low motiva-
tion γm.14
For simplicity, we set the lower bounds of the support of the dis-
tribution for both attributes at θA = 1 and γm = 0 (then, workers can
be either intrinsically motivated or not motivated at all) and denote
θa = θ and γM = γ. Furthermore, we impose that 0 < γ ≤ 1: this ensures
that the non-profit hospital pays non-negative salaries to moti-
vated workers at the first-best. Finally, we assume that 1 < θ ≤ 2: this
implies that the non-profit hospital has two possible different
orderings of effort levels exerted by workers’ types (see the chains
of inequalities 3 and 6 referring to the first-best and to
implementable allocations, respectively).
To sum up, there are four types of health professionals, denoted
as ij AM Am aM am= { }, , , , where the first index represents ability and
the second index represents motivation.
When a worker is not hired by any hospital, we assume that her
utility is zero. If a worker is hired by one hospital, her reservation
utility or outside option is endogenous and it depends on the con-
tract offered by the rival hospital.
When a health professional is hired by the for-profit hospital,
her utility is
U w eijFP ij i ij= −
1
2
2θ .
Motivated workers do not enjoy any benefit from motivation
when hired by the for-profit hospital. As a consequence, from the
point of view of the for-profit hospital, workers AM and Am are equiv-
alent because they are equally productive, as well as workers aM
and am.15
When a worker is hired by the non-profit hospital, her utility
depends both onmonetary rewards and onwork activities, and takes
the form
U w e eijNP ij i ij j ij= − +
1
2
2θ γ ,
where both ability θi and motivation γj are related to effort exer-
tion. The marginal rate of substitution between effort and wage is
given by
MRS
U e
U w
ee wNP
ij
NP
ij
ij
NP
ij
i ij j, ,= −
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
= −θ γ
which is always positive for non-motivatedworkerswith γj = 0.When
the effort required by the non-profit hospital is sufficiently low, i.e.
eij
j
i
<
γ
θ for j = M, then motivated workers’ indifference curves have
a negative slope in the space e w,( ). Notice thatworkers’ utility func-
tion UijNP satisfies the single-crossing property but onlywith respect
to each parameter of private information at a time. In fact, the in-
difference curves of workerswith the samemotivation but different
ability, or with the same ability but different motivation, intersect
only once at e = 0. Nonetheless, the single-crossing property does
not hold when both ability and motivation change simultaneously.
Remark 1. The indifference curves of high-ability non-motivated
workers and low-ability motivated workers (i.e. intermediate types Am
and aM), hired by the non-profit hospital, cross twice at e = 0 and also
at e M
a A
=
−
=
−
2 2
1
γ
θ θ
γ
θ
.
11 Notice that this is just a reduced form of a more detailed modelling of the dif-
ference between hospitals’ organizational forms, which could be the following. Let
the production function of the hospital be q e Ae( ) = , with A > 1, and assume that the
non-profit hospital’s mission consists in providing care to both insured and unin-
sured patients. Then, hospital NP is compensated only for the fraction of insured
patients that it treats, while its revenue is zero when treating uninsured patients.
Let αNP ∈( )0 1, denote the fraction of compensated care, so that profits to hospital
NP from hiring a single worker are π α αNP NP NP NPq e w Ae w= ( ) − = − , where the price
of treatment is already set at p = 1. With a slight loss of generality, set A in such a
way that αNPA = 1, whereby hospitals’ profits per worker are as the ones proposed
in the main text, with k ANP NP≡ =α 1 and k kFP NP≡ = >
1
1
α
.
12 A similar interpretation of a non-profit firm as a profit-constrained organiza-
tion was first proposed in Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), following the ideas expressed
in Hansmann (1996) (see also Brekke et al., 2012; Ghatak andMueller, 2011). However,
in this literature, it is assumed that the non-profit firm is only able to appropriate
a fraction α of its profits, so that α αNP FP< =1 . Another difference is that, in our spec-
ification, kH multiplies revenues rather than profits. We emphasise again that
k kFP = >1 has to be interpreted in relative terms and not in absolute value.
13 Since there exists a one-to-one relationship between effort exerted and number
of patients treated by the hospital, we consider intrinsic motivation as the enjoy-
ment of one’s personal contribution to the mission of the non-profit organization.
A similar interpretation of intrinsic motivation can be found in Besley and Ghatak
(2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008, 2010)-only as for Section 5).
14 In Sections 4.3 and 5, to fully characterize optimal contracts, we will restrict at-
tention to a uniform distribution of both workers’ characteristics.
15 However, workers with the same ability but different motivation potentially
benefit from different outside options.
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Fig. 1 represents these facts. The failure of the single-crossing
condition makes the screening problem of the non-profit hospital
hard to solve.
The timing of the game is as follows. The two hospitals simul-
taneously offer menus of contracts of the form e wijH ijH,{ }, with
H FP NP∈{ }, . Workers observe the contracts, and choose which hos-
pital (if any) to work for. Then workers exert the effort level specified
by the chosen contract, patients are treated, and the contracted wage
is paid.
An equilibrium is such that each hospital chooses a menu of con-
tracts that maximizes its expected profit, given the contracts offered
by the rival hospital and given the equilibrium choice of workers.
Health professionals choose the contract that maximizes their utility.
Hospitals are bound to offer contracts thatmake non-negative profits.
If a worker is indifferent between working for the two hospitals, it
is assumed that, with probability one, she will work for the hos-
pital making the highest profit on that type.16
In Section 4, we will study competition with (bidimensional)
adverse selection. Our framework originates from the combina-
tion of two simpler environments: (i) two firms competing to attract
heterogeneous workers under full information; (ii) a monopsonis-
tic firm designing screening contracts under asymmetric information.
Competition under full information will be shortly examined in
Subsection 3.2, whereas for monopsonistic bidimensional screen-
ing, we refer the reader to Barigozzi and Burani (2016). In the
qualitative description of optimal contracts in Section 4, wewill refer
to “second-best” effort levels as the solution to the screening pro-
gramme of themonopsony, with type-independent (i.e. zero) outside
options.
3. Benchmark cases
In this section, we illustrate the first-best allocation and the ef-
ficient assignment of workers to hospitals, the equilibrium with
competing hospitals under full information, and, finally, the outcome
with monopsony and entry deterrence under asymmetric
information.
3.1. The first-best
Consider the total surplus generated by a specific hospital-
worker pair, i.e. the sum of hospital H profit and worker ij utility
TS k e eijH H j ijH i ijH= +( ) − ( )γ θ12
2,
where the term γ j ijHe is equal to zero when H = FP. Then, the first-
best effort levels are those that maximize total surplus TSijH , for each
hospital H and for each worker’s type ij. They have the following
expressions
e e k e e
k
AM
FB FP
Am
FB FP
aM
FB FP
am
FB FP, , , ,,= = = =
θ
(1)
for the for-profit hospital, where e eAj
FB FP
aj
FB FP, ,> always holds for j = m,
M, and
e e e eAM
FB NP
Am
FB NP
aM
FB NP
am
FB NP, , , ,, ,= + = =
+
=1 1
1 1γ γ
θ θ
and (2)
for the non-profit hospital, where
e e e e e eAM
FB NP
Am
FB NP
aM
FB NP
Am
FB NP
aM
FB NP
am
, , , , ,max ; min ;> { } ≥ { } > FB NP, , (3)
with e eaMFB NP Am
FB NP, ,> if and only if
Δ Δγ γ θ θ≡ > −( ) ≡1 . (4)
The ranking of first-best effort levels for workers hired by the
non-profit hospital depends on the relative importance of the dif-
ference in ability Δθ vis à vis the difference in motivation Δγ.17 When
condition (4) holds, the heterogeneity in motivation is higher than
the heterogeneity in ability and motivated workers provide the
highest levels of effort (irrespective of ability); when instead in-
equality (4) is reversed, the heterogeneity in ability is higher than
the heterogeneity in motivation and high-ability health profession-
als provide the highest levels of effort (irrespective of their
motivation).
Health professionals are efficiently assigned to the hospital for
whom the highest total surplus is realized. In particular, by inspec-
tion of expressions (1) and (2), it is easy to see that the efficient
assignment of workers to hospitals depends on the relative mag-
nitude of the terms 1 + γ and k.
Remark 2. Efficient assignment of workers to hospitals
The efficient assignment is such that: (a) when k > 1 + γ, all workers
are allocated to the for-profit hospital; (b) when k < 1 + γ, motivated
workers are assigned to the non-profit hospital and non-motivated types
are assigned to the for-profit hospital; (c) when k = 1 + γ, non-
motivated workers are allocated to the for-profit hospital and motivated
types are randomly assigned to any hospital.
The efficient assignment is such that non-motivated workers are
always employed by the for-profit hospital, whereas motivated
workers can be employed by either the non-profit or the for-
profit hospital depending on which employer has a competitive
advantage in hiring these workers.
When k < 1 + γ holds, the level of motivation is sufficiently high
so as to exceed the relative advantage of the for-profit with respect
to the non-profit hospital in terms of revenue appropriation. In this
case, it is efficient that for-profit and non-profit hospitals coexist.
So, when k < 1 + γ, the non-profit hospital has a competitive advan-
tagewith respect to the for-profit competitor in employingmotivated
16 In fact, the hospital with the higher, strictly positive payoff is able to raise her
reward by ε > 0 and break the tie.
17 Given the simplification γm = 0, we will refer to the difference in motivation Δγ
and to the level of motivation γ interchangeably.
Fig. 1. Zero-level indifference curves for workers hired by hospital NP.
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workers. Otherwise, when k > 1 + γ, the for-profit hospital has a com-
petitive advantage with respect to the rival in employing all types
of workers; it is then efficient that only the for-profit hospital sur-
vives. In the boundary case in which k = 1 + γ, motivated workers
are randomly assigned to any hospital.18
3.1.1. The first-best total surplus
When studying the interaction between hospitals, a crucial role
is played by the concept of first-best total surplus, which is defined
as follows.
A hospital H FP NP∈{ }, offers a worker her first-best total surplus
when the contract is such that: (i) the effort level is set at the first-
best eij
FB H, , and (ii) the total wage is obtained imposing that the
hospital makes zero profits from that type of worker, i.e.
π ij
H H
ij
FB H
ij
H
ij
H H
ij
FB Hk e w w k e= − = ⇔ =, , .0
In this way, a health professional receives the maximal possi-
ble utility, corresponding to the whole total surplus, which is given
by
U k e e eij
TS H H
ij
FB H
i ij
FB H
j ij
FB H, , , , ,= − ( ) +1
2
2θ γ (5)
where the superscript TS stands for total surplus and where, again,
the term γ j ijFB He , is equal to zero when the hospital is the for-profit
one.
An important feature of first-best total surplus utilities is that,
for the for-profit hospital, they only differ according to ability and
are such that U UAj
TS FP
aj
TS FP, ,> with j = m, M, whereas for the non-
profit hospital, they are such that U UAM
TS NP
Am
TS NP, ,> and U UaMTS NP amTS NP, ,> .
Indeed, the non-profit hospital offers a strictly highermaximal utility
to motivated workers than to non-motivated types with the same
ability because the former provide more effort and treat more pa-
tients than the latter.
3.2. Competition under full information
Suppose now that the two hospitals observe the workers’ types
and compete to attract them. The two hospitals simultaneously offer
each worker a contract e wijH ijH,( ), with H FP NP∈{ }, .
The best strategy for each hospital is to ask every health pro-
fessional to provide her first-best effort level: this allows the two
hospitals to generate the highest revenue to be used to attract the
worker.19 The hospital that has a competitive disadvantage in hiring
a worker’s typemakes zero profits on that type and offers her a wage
providing the first-best total surplus utility defined in (5).20 The hos-
pital that has a competitive advantage, instead, designs a contract
that just meets the rival’s offer and is able to attract the worker.
Remark 3. Equilibrium under full information
(i) The sorting of workers to hospitals is efficient. (ii) Optimal con-
tracts are such that: (ii.a) all effort levels are set at the first-best; (ii.b)
workers receive a payoff corresponding to the first-best total surplus
offered by the hospital not hiring them; (ii.c) both hospitals earn pos-
itive profits from the types they hire.
When k < 1 + γ, the non-profit hospital has a competitive advan-
tage in hiringmotivated health professionals. The disadvantaged for-
profit hospital will offer the first-best total surplus to motivated
workers, and the non-profit hospital will meet that offer attract-
ing motivated workers. In the same way, the non-profit hospital will
offer the first-best total surplus to non-motivated workers, and the
for-profit hospital will meet that offer attracting theseworkers.When
instead k > 1 + γ, the for-profit hospital has a competitive advan-
tage over all workers’ types and hires all of them. Finally, when
k = 1 + γ, no hospital has a competitive advantage relative to moti-
vated types and the tie-breaking rule does not apply either because
both hospitals earn zero profits from these types.
In Appendix S1(A), we derive the wages offered by the two hos-
pitals in equilibrium.
3.3. Asymmetric information and entry deterrence
This subsection introduces screening under asymmetric infor-
mation but avoids interacting it with competition between the two
hospitals, which will instead be the subject of the next Section 4.
Recall that, when k > 1 + γ, the for-profit hospital has a compet-
itive advantage in hiring all workers’ types. Accordingly, wewill show
that all worker’s types are hired by the for-profit hospital, whereas
the non-profit hospital remains inactive. Following Biglaiser and
Mezzetti (1993), the for-profit hospital is fully dominant in this case
because it is able to hire all workers and tomake non-negative profits
on all types, even when the dominated non-profit hospital offers
them the first-best total surplus Uij
TS NP, . Thus, we are going to study
a screening problem with type-dependent but exogenous outside
options.
3.3.1. The fully dominant for-profit hospital
Let us start with illustrating a general property of screening con-
tracts offered by the for-profit hospital, which also holds when the
for-profit hospital is not fully dominant.
Remark 4. For-profit hospital’s screening contracts
Any incentive compatible contract that the for-profit hospital might
offer must be the same for workers with the same ability, whereby
e e and e eAMFP AmFP aMFP amFP= =
and
w w and w wAMFP AmFP aMFP amFP= = .
The for-profit hospital is only able to screen applicants on the
basis of their ability, whereas intrinsic motivation does not affect
the contracted effort and the amount of care provided. However,
types characterized by the same ability and different intrinsic mo-
tivation are not identical from the for-profit hospital’s viewpoint
because they enjoy different outside options. In particular, intrin-
sic motivation positively affects motivated workers’ outside options.
The fully dominant for-profit hospital must offer to all workers’ types
a utility just exceeding their highest outside option, i.e. the first-
best total surplus utility left by the non-profit hospital to motivated
workers.
The programme of the fully dominant for-profit hospital corre-
sponds to the two-types (i.e. high and low-ability workers)21
screening problem
max ,,e w
FP
A
FP
A
FP
a
FP
a
FP
i
FP
i
FP E ke w ke w PFP( ) [ ] = −( ) + −( ) −( ) ( )π ν ν1
with i = a, A, subject to the two participation constraints of moti-
vated types18 This will have implications for the efficiency of the equilibrium sorting of workers
to hospitals under asymmetric information (see Remark 5).
19 Notice that the game describes a situation in which two heterogeneous firms
compete à la Bertrand to attract a worker of known type.
20 Indeed, any lower wage possibly offered by the disadvantaged hospital would
generate profitable deviations and thus cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy.
21 Accordingly, we omit subindeces j = m, M related to motivation, when no con-
fusion arises.
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w e U PCiFP i iFP iM
TS NP
iM
FP
− ( ) ≥ ( )1
2
2θ , ,
for every i = a, A,22 and to the two incentive compatibility
constraints
w e w e ICiFP i iFP iFP i iFP ivsiFP− ( ) ≥ − ( ) ( )′ ′ ′12
1
2
2 2θ θ
for every i = a, A with i′ ≠ i (see Appendix S1(B)). Adding the two in-
centive constraints, one obtains the standard monotonicity condition
e eAFP aFP≥ , requiring that high-ability workers provide more effort
than low-ability types.
To solve this problem, we build on the analysis of Laffont and
Martimort (2002, Chapter 3.3). They study type-dependent partic-
ipation constraints and countervailing incentives when there are two
types of agent and the outside option of the efficient type is strict-
ly higher than that of the inefficient type, which is normalized to
zero. The solution exhibits five different regimes according to which
participation and incentive compatibility constraints are binding.
In our case, which regime is in place depends on the magni-
tude of the difference in outside opportunities given by the non-
profit hospital to high-skilled and low-skilled motivated workers,
respectively, i.e. U UAM
TS NP
aM
TS NP, ,
− .
At one extreme, when the difference U UAM
TS NP
aM
TS NP, ,
− is low, Regime
1 holds. The competitive pressure exerted by hospital NP on the rival
is low and the problem of the for-profit hospital is not perturbed
substantially with respect to a standard, two-types screening problem
with exogenous and type-independent reservation utilities: outside
options are irrelevant and the for-profit hospital sets second-best
effort levels. In this regime, high-ability workers try to mimic
low-ability colleagues and, thus, the incentive constraint that high-
skilled workers do not choose the contract designed for low-
skilled types is binding. The for-profit hospital optimally distorts
the effort required from low-ability workers downward to save in
information rents left to high-ability health professionals. More-
over, low-skilled types are indifferent between the contract offered
by the for-profit hospital or the reservation utility UaMTS NP, offered by
the non-profit hospital.
At the other extreme, when the difference U UAM
TS NP
aM
TS NP, ,
− is high,
Regime 5 attains. The competitive pressure exerted by the non-
profit hospital is sufficiently strong so as to alter the natural ordering
of incentive and participation constraints in the screening problem
of the for-profit hospital. Now, countervailing incentives arise,
meaning that low-ability workers try to mimic high-ability col-
leagues (because the latter enjoymuch higher rents than the former),
so that the incentive constraint that low-skilled workers do not
choose the contract designed for high-skilled types is binding. The
for-profit hospital optimally distorts the effort required from high-
ability workers upward, making them indifferent between its contract
and the high outside option UAM
TS NP, offered by the non-profit hospital.
In-between, when the difference in total surplus utilities is in-
termediate, Regimes 2 to 4 occur. Both types’ participation constraints
are binding, whereby both high- and low-ability workers are in-
different between employment contracts offered by the two hospitals.
In particular, in Regime 3, no incentive constraint is binding, so that
there is no envy between workers with different skills, and the ef-
ficient effort levels are set.
The solution to the screening programme of the fully domi-
nant for-profit hospital is derived in Appendix S1(B), where the 5
regimes in which the for-profit hospital might find itself are
analyzed in turn. The lemma that follows summarizes ourmain find-
ings, using the fact that the relevant thresholds for the difference
U UAM
TS NP
aM
TS NP, ,
− are inversely related to the magnitude of parameter
k.
Lemma 1. Fully dominant for-profit hospital
(i) The for-profit hospital is fully dominant only if k > 1 + γ. (ii)
Optimal allocations are such that the ‘no distortion at the top’ prop-
erty is satisfied and (downward) effort distortions for low-ability workers
are increasing in k. In particular: (ii.1)when k is high (sufficiently higher
than 1 + γ), outside options are irrelevant and effort for low-ability
workers is set at the second-best; (ii.2) when k is intermediate, the effort
for low-ability types is distorted downward but less than at the second-
best; and (ii.3) when k is low (close to 1 + γ), all effort levels are set at
the first-best.
Lemma 1 states that the for-profit hospital can be fully domi-
nant only when it has a competitive advantage with respect to the
rival hospital in hiring all workers. In particular, the higher is k with
respect to 1 + γ, the lower the competitive pressure exerted by the
rival non-profit hospital (this occurs because, as mentioned before,
high levels of k correspond to low values of the difference
U UAM
TS NP
aM
TS NP, ,
− ). Given that k is bounded below by 1 + γ when the for-
profit hospital is fully dominant, the competitive pressure from the
rival hospital is never so high as to give rise to countervailing in-
centives: optimal contracts are such that the effort level required
from high-ability workers is never distorted, whereas the effort level
set for low-ability workers can be distorted downward. Moreover,
when the competitive pressure from the non-profit hospital is ir-
relevant, Regime 1 holds and the standard second-best solution
attains. When the competitive advantage of the for-profit hospital
decreases, the downward distortion in the effort level required from
low-ability workers also decreases, and Regime 2 holds. Finally, when
the threat of entry by the non-profit hospital becomes relevant, then
Regime 3 attains and the allocation is fully efficient.23
4. Competition under bidimensional adverse selection
Suppose now that 1 < k ≤ 1 + γ, in which case the for-profit hos-
pital is not fully dominant and both hospitals are active in
equilibrium. Still, each hospital is dominant relative to a subset of
types. In particular, the non-profit hospital has a competitive ad-
vantage in hiring motivated workers and is thus dominant relative
to these workers, whereas the for-profit hospital has a competi-
tive advantage in hiring non-motivated workers and it is dominant
relative to these workers.
In equilibrium, each hospital offers four (potentially different)
contracts that must always satisfy internal incentive compatibili-
ty, independent of the fact that some contracts will not be chosen
and will remain out-of-equilibrium contracts. Moreover, each hos-
pital forms a conjecture about the workers’ self-selection to hospitals
and this will help it define which are the relevant (now endog-
enous) outside options and thus which are the possible binding
participation constraints.24 In equilibrium, hospitals’ conjectures
about the sorting of workers are correct and are such that the hos-
pital, which is dominated relative to a given subset of types, will
expect these types to be hired by the rival hospital and will offer
these types out-of-equilibrium contracts.
22 Given the magnitudes of Uij
TS NP, , only the participation constraints of motivated
types matter. Indeed, once PCAMFP is satisfied, then PCAmFP is slack and, similarly, once
PCaMFP holds, then PCamFP is slack.
23 Note that, when k = 1 + γ, we would expect Regime 3 to hold, but the for-profit
hospital cannot not be fully dominant in this case. See the discussion below
Remark 5.
24 As will be clear in what follows, for each hospital, only the participation con-
straints of non-motivated workers will be relevant.
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Intuitively, when 1 < k ≤ 1 + γ, at equilibrium, the sorting of
workers to hospitals is based on motivation.25
Proposition 1. Equilibrium sorting of workers to hospitals
When 1 < k ≤ 1 + γ, the equilibrium sorting of workers to hospitals
is unique and it only depends on motivation (i.e. it is ability-neutral):
motivated workers self-select into the non-profit hospital and non-
motivated workers self-select into the for-profit hospital.
Proof. See Appendix S1(C). ■
Proposition 1 delivers some general insights about the average
level of ability of workers hired by the two hospitals. In effect, the
results contained in Proposition 1 do not depend on the assump-
tions made about the distribution of types and are thus robust to
changes in such distribution.
Corollary 1. Workers’ self-selection and the distribution of types
The equilibrium sorting of workers according to motivation is in-
dependent of the distribution of types. (i) When skills and intrinsic
motivation are independently distributed, ability-neutrality implies that
average ability is the same for both hospitals’ employees. (ii) When skills
and intrinsic motivation are positively (respectively, negatively) cor-
related, ability-neutrality implies that average ability is higher
(respectively lower) for workers employed at the non-profit than at the
for-profit hospital.
We can thus foresee which are the determinants of wage dif-
ferentials in labourmarkets where non-profit and for-profit hospitals
coexist. Suppose that a wage penalty for workers hired by the non-
profit hospital exists and suppose that we want to disentangle the
pure compensating differential effect caused by workers’ motiva-
tion from the negative selection effect of ability. Then, when skills
and intrinsic motivation are independently distributed, the wage
gap is totally driven by motivation and the non-profit hospital is
not affected by adverse selection with respect to ability. If instead
skills and intrinsic motivation were negatively correlated, then the
wage penalty would partly be explained by a true compensating
wage differential and it would partly be caused by adverse selec-
tion with respect to ability. Finally, if skills and intrinsic motivation
were positively correlated, the wage gap would only arise because
of motivation and it would partially be offset by a propitious se-
lection effect with respect to ability.
In the next subsections, we first describe the procedure fol-
lowed to find candidate equilibria and we then provide the full
characterization of equilibrium contracts. Before doing so, let us
mention that, combining the results contained in Proposition 1 and
in Lemma 1, it is possible to talk about the efficiency of the equi-
librium sorting of workers to hospitals under asymmetric
information, considering not only the case of full competition
between hospitals considered in the present section, but also the
case of deterred entry analyzed in Section 3.3.
Remark 5. Workers’ self-selection and efficiency
The sorting of workers to hospitals under asymmetric information
is efficient when 1 < k ≤ 1 + γ or when k is sufficiently higher than 1 + γ.
The outcome of the self-selection of workers under asymmet-
ric information is the same as the assignment that a fully informed
social planner would choose, the unique exceptions consisting in
the case in which k = 1 + γ or in the case in which k approaches 1 + γ
from above. To understand why, consider that, when k = 1 + γ,
efficiency requires that motivated workers be randomly allocated
to either the for-profit or the non-profit hospital, whereas, when k
is slightly higher than 1 + γ, efficiency requires that all workers be
assigned to the for-profit hospital (see Remark 2). However, from
Proposition 1, the unique equilibrium sorting when k = 1 + γ is such
that motivated workers choose to work for the non-profit hospi-
tal; also Lemma 1 states that the for-profit hospital is fully dominant
and is thus able to attract all workers only when k is sufficiently
higher than 1 + γ, but not when k is close to 1 + γ. When hiring all
workers, the for-profit hospital is bound by incentive compatibil-
ity to offer the same contract to workers with the same ability,
providing them with a utility that just exceeds the high outside
option of motivated workers. This drives its profits from all types
close to (or down to) zero when k is close to (or equal to) 1 + γ. Such
a situation cannot be an equilibrium because the for-profit hospi-
tal can profitably deviate by renouncing to hire motivated workers.
By so doing, the for-profit hospital would obtain higher profits from
non-motivated workers, which more than compensate the profits
lost from motivated workers.26
4.1. The for-profit hospital
Recall that the for-profit hospital offers the same contract to
workers with the same ability. It is dominated with respect to mo-
tivated workers, so it anticipates that it is going to attract non-
motivated types only. As already mentioned, to succeed in hiring
non-motivated types Am and am, the for-profit principal must be
able to provide them with a level of utility which just exceeds UAmNP
and UamNP , respectively. Then, the for-profit hospital’s programme is
PFP( ) as in Section 3.3.1 when it is fully dominant, but with differ-
ent relevant participation constraints, namely those of non-
motivated workers
w e U PCiFP i iFP imNP iMFP− ( ) ≥ ( )12
2θ
for every i = a, A.
One can replicate the analysis which has been carried out in
Section 3.3.1 and in Appendix S1(B), using PCimFP above and substi-
tuting the difference in total surplus utilities of motivated types
U UAM
TS NP
aM
TS NP, ,
− , which mattered there, with the difference in reser-
vation utilities of non-motivated types U UAmNP amNP− .
Notice that the two hospitals’ programmes are now interdepen-
dent. Indeed, when PCimFP is binding for the worker with ability i = a,
A, then it must necessarily be the case that PCimNP is binding as well.
In other words, U U UiMFP imFP imNP= = and type im is indifferent between
working for either hospital (the tie-breaking rule mentioned at the
end of Section 2 might then apply). Conversely, when PCimFP is slack,
then it must be that U UimFP imNP> , so that type im strictly prefers to work
for the for-profit rather than for the non-profit hospital.
Also notice that the difference in reservation utilities U UAmNP amNP−
is now endogenous but, because of the simultaneity of moves, is
taken as given by the for-profit hospital. One can then build the best
response of the for-profit hospital, which specifies, for each possi-
ble difference in reservation utilities offered by the non-profit
hospital, the incentive scheme that maximizes the expected profits
of the for-profit hospital that is interested in hiring non-motivated
types only. Such best response has two nice features: (i) it depends
on a single variable, i.e. the difference U UAmNP amNP− , and (ii) it is single-
valued, because, for each level of U UAmNP amNP− , the optimal contract
offered by the for-profit hospital is uniquely defined. Fig. 225 Proposition 1 extends to our setting with asymmetric information the result ob-
tained by Delfgaauw and Dur (2010). They show that, when motivation is output-
oriented (as in our case), workers’ self-selection is ability-neutral, and workers sorting
into the public sector are the more motivated ones. When, instead, motivation is
unrelated to effort provision or output, then only workers with low ability sort into
the public sector, where wages are efficiently lower than in the private sector.
26 Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1993) also find an inefficient assignment of workers to
principals under some parameter configurations.
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summarizes the analysis by representing the reaction function of
the for-profit hospital.27
The five different regimes presented in Section 3.3.1 and Appendix
S1(B) are still in place and so are the optimal effort levels associ-
ated with each regime.
4.2. The non-profit hospital
As opposed to the for-profit hospital, the non-profit hospital offers
up to four different contracts, one for each type of health profes-
sional. In equilibrium, the non-profit organization expects to hire
motivated agents only and designs out-of-equilibrium contracts for
non-motivated types so as to satisfy internal incentive compatibil-
ity. The programme of the non-profit hospital consists in a
bidimensional screening problem with type-dependent and en-
dogenous outside options, which is as follows
max ,e w
NP
AM
NP
AM
NP
Am
NP
Am
NP
ij
NP
ij
NP E e w e w( ) [ ] = −( ) + −( ) −( )π νμ ν μ1
+ −( ) −( ) + −( ) −( ) −( ) ( )1 1 1ν μ ν μe w e w PNPaMNP aMNP amNP amNP
subject to four participation constraints whose generic form is
w e e U PCij i ijNP j ijNP ijFP ijNP− ( ) + ≥ ( )12
2θ γ
and twelve incentive compatibility constraints that are such that
w e e w e eijNP i ijNP j ijNP i jNP i i jNP j i jN− ( ) + ≥ − ( ) +′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′12
1
2
2 2θ γ θ γ P ijvsi jNPIC ′ ′( )
with ij different from i′j′. The complete list of participation and in-
centive constraints is given in Appendix S1(D).
The solution to this programme is found extending the analy-
sis of a companion paper, Barigozzi and Burani (2016), where
bidimensional screening is considered for type-independent res-
ervation utilities, which are normalized to zero. As usual in these
kinds of problems, one first guesses which participation and in-
centive constraints are binding and then checks ex-post that the
omitted constraints are satisfied as well.
As for participation constraints, one can show (see again Appendix
S1(D)) that, once ICiMvsimNP and PCimNP are both satisfied, then PCiMNP is
slack, with i = a, A. In other words, when considering types with the
same ability but different motivation, one can disregard the par-
ticipation constraint of motivated health professionals because it
is implied by the participation constraint of non-motivated workers.
The same conclusion cannot be drawn for workers with the same
motivation but different ability. Thus, both PCAmNP and PCamNP might
be relevant and the latter does not imply the former.
As for incentive compatibility constraints, adding them two
by two, one obtains the following implementability or monotonic-
ity condition
e e e e e eAMNP AmNP aMNP AmNP aMNP amNP≥ { } ≥ { } ≥max ; min ; . (6)
Therefore, in line with the first-best, there exist two different
orderings of workers’ effort levels. Worker AM will be asked to exert
the highest effort, and to treat the highest number of patients,
whereas worker am will provide the lowest effort and will treat the
smallest number of patients. The levels of effort required from types
Am and aM are in-between and cannot be ranked unambiguously.
Three possible states of the word must then be considered (see con-
ditions 22 and 23 in Appendix S1(D)).
(i) Motivation prevails (Case M). If the heterogeneity in moti-
vation is more relevant than the heterogeneity in ability
(i.e. if γ is high with respect to Δθ), then optimal contracts
are such that e e e eAMNP aMNP AmNP amNP≥ > ≥ . Hence, motivated health
professionals are asked to provide more effort and treat a
higher number of patients than non-motivated workers,
irrespective of ability.
(ii) Ability prevails (Case A ). If the heterogeneity in ability is more
relevant than the heterogeneity in motivation (i.e. if γ is low
relative to Δθ), then optimal effort levels are such that
e e e eAMNP AmNP aMNP amNP≥ > ≥ . Then, high-ability health professionals
27 Notice that Fig. 2 could also represent the best response of the for-profit hos-
pital when it is fully dominant (see Section 3.3.1). The distinction concerns the
horizontal axis, where, here, the endogenous difference in non-motivated workers’
outside options is displayed, whereas, there, the exogenous difference in moti-
vated workers’ total surplus utilities should be represented.
Fig. 2. Reaction function of hospital FP when 1 ≤ k ≤ 1 + γ.
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provide more effort and treat more patients than low-
ability workers, irrespective of motivation.
(iii) Pooling of intermediate types (Case P ). When neither ability
nor motivation prevail (i.e. when γ is close to Δθ), it becomes
impossible for the non-profit hospital to separate interme-
diate types and optimal allocations are such that
e e e eAMNP AmNP aMNP amNP≥ = ≥ . A pooling contract must be designed
for types aM and Am, who provide the same effort.
Monotonicity condition (6) has to be confronted with the equi-
librium sorting of workers, according to which onlymotivated health
professionals accept employment at the non-profit hospital. When
motivation prevails, the non-profit hospital is able to hire the two
most productive workers and designs out-of-equilibrium con-
tracts for the two least productive workers. We show that, when
motivation prevails, optimal allocations are the same as at the
second-best (i.e. without competition) because the competitive pres-
sure from the for-profit hospital does not substantially alter the
design of the screening problem for the non-profit hospital.28 When,
instead, ability prevails, the participation constraints of non-
motivated workers do not tie-in naturally with the ranking imposed
by implementability because the non-profit hospital is able to hire
the first and the third most productive workers. Then, non-standard
incentive constraints may become binding. The rent extraction-
efficiency trade-off faced by the non-profit hospital is solved by
setting efficient allocations.When neither motivation nor ability pre-
vails, intermediate types are given the same contract and allocative
distortions arise, which are nonetheless lower than at the
second-best.
The first step toward finding the solution to the non-profit ho-
spital’s programme consists in determining which participation
constraint, between the ones of non-motivated workers, is binding
for the non-profit hospital. To do so, we take each one of the pos-
sible five regimes, in which the for-profit hospital can find itself,
as given. When PCimFP , with i = a, A, is binding, it means that PCimNP is
binding as well and that type im is indifferent between the con-
tracts offered by the two hospitals. Then, the dominated non-
profit hospital will offer this type her first-best total surplus and
will make zero profits from this type. Conversely, when PCimFP , with
i = a, A, is slack, the effort required from the non-motivated worker
im is set preserving incentive compatibility.29 The solution will typ-
ically depend on whether Case M, Case A , or Case P prevails.
Moreover, the solution might not be unique, for example because
both fully separating and pooling contracts are feasible in a given
parameter range. When multiple solutions coexist, we take the one
guaranteeing the highest profits to hospital NP. We are then able
to build the best response of the non-profit hospital, which is more
difficult to characterize than the reaction function of hospital FP
because: i( ) it depends on more than one variable, i.e. on both UAmFP
and UamFP separately, and ii( ) for given levels of UAmFP and UamFP , it is
not single-valued, given that the screening contracts offered by the
non-profit hospital vary according to whether motivation or ability
prevails (or else according to the relative magnitude of γ and Δθ).
Once the bidimensional screening problem of the non-profit hos-
pital is solved, the difference in reservation utilities U UAmNP amNP− , which
enters the solution to the for-profit hospital’s programme, is fully
determined. The last step of the analysis is checking whether such
difference in reservation utilities is compatible with the bounds de-
fining the selected regime for the for-profit hospital. If so, then the
solution obtained is an equilibrium; otherwise, it must be dis-
carded. In other words, one must check whether the best responses
of the two competing hospitals are compatible with each other. We
repeat the same procedure for all possible regimes for hospital FP,
from 1 to 5. This analysis is relegated to Appendix S1(E), where we
also show that, paralleling the case of the for-profit hospital being
fully dominant, not all regimes in which the for-profit hospital can
find itself are relevant, because only the first three are feasible. Ac-
cordingly, the for-profit hospital will either distort effort required
from low-ability workers downward, or it will set the efficient level
of effort for all workers.
Last, but not least, consider that the for-profit hospital is con-
strained to offer only two contracts and that non-motivated types
are worse-off when mimicking motivated workers employed by the
non-profit hospital. Thus, one may easily check that incentive com-
patibility between hospitals is always satisfied in equilibrium.
4.3. Sorting according to motivation
In what follows, we characterize the optimal incentive schemes
offered by the two competing hospitals when 1 < k ≤ 1 + γ and when
workers sort themselves by motivation. We simplify the analysis
by restricting attention to a uniform distribution of types, whereby
the probability of each type is set equal to 1/4.
In our setting, there are two driving forces that shape optimal
contracts. The first is incentive compatibility, which is important
for each hospital in isolation. It prescribes that, when ‘good’ types
of workers have incentive to mimic ‘bad’ types, then it is optimal
for the principal to distort allocations for ‘bad’ types to reduce the
informational advantage of ‘good’ types. The second force is rep-
resented by outside options, which make the screening problems
of the two hospitals interdependent, because a worker’s outside
option sets a lower bound on the utility that she must obtain from
the hospital hiring her. The more intense the competition between
hospitals is, the more relevant outside options become relative to
internal incentive compatibility, and the lower the need for each
hospital to save in information rents by distorting allocations. There-
fore, distortions tend to disappear when competition is tough and
optimal allocations revert to the first-best.
When k is high (i.e. close to 1 + γ), it means that the for-profit
hospital has a high competitive advantage in terms of revenue ap-
propriation. Similarly, when γ is significant, it means that the non-
profit hospital has a high advantage stemming fromworkers’ intrinsic
motivation. Therefore, when both k and γ are high, hospitals are suf-
ficiently differentiated from each other and the degree of competition
between them is mild. When this occurs, outside options are not
particularly relevant and internal incentive compatibility is the
driving force in determining optimal allocations. Indeed, effort levels
for hired workers are set at the second-best, as in the absence of
competition. Conversely, when k is low (i.e. close to 1), and moti-
vation γ is also low, it means that the degree of competition between
hospitals is high because hospitals are very similar to each other.
Then, outside options are the main determinant of optimal effort
levels, whereas internal incentive compatibility only plays a minor
role. This outcome resembles the full information equilibrium cor-
responding to Bertrand competition, with each hospital setting first-
best effort levels.
Proposition 2 summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 2. Competition and optimal allocations
Effort provided by high-ability workers is not distorted. Effort pro-
vided by low-ability workers is such that: (i) If competition is mild (if
k is high and γ is not too low), then effort is set at the second-best by
both hospitals. (ii) If competition is harsh (i.e. if both k and γ are low),
28 Nonetheless, the existence of a competing hospital shifts the division of the surplus
generated by the NP hospital-worker pair in favour of workers, given that they enjoy
higher outside opportunities.
29 For the sake of concreteness, suppose that the for-profit hospital is in the regime
where outside options are irrelevant (Regime 1 in Fig. 2). Then PCAmFP is slack, i.e.
U UAmFP AmNP> , while PCamFP is binding, i.e. U UamFP amNP= . Thus, the programme for the non-
profit hospital is such that only PCamNP is binding, and the contract offered to type
am provides her with the total surplus utility U U UamTS NP amNP amFP, = = .
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then effort is set at the first-best by both hospitals (iii) Otherwise, effort
levels might be set in-between the first- and the second-best.
Therefore, the ‘no distortion at the top’ property holds and (down-
ward) distortions in effort provided by low-ability workers are
decreasing in the degree of competition between hospitals.
Moreover, notice that a high value of k can be interpreted as a
high mandatory charity care standard (or else a high voluntary
charity care provision).30 Thus, the government can affect the degree
of competition between hospitals by properly setting the value of
k. In particular, Proposition 2 has the following policy implication.31
Corollary 2. From an efficiency viewpoint, a low mandatory charity
care standard (a low k) is beneficial for two reasons: (i) it allows the
non-profit hospital to coexist with the for-profit one (i.e. it allows the
condition 1 < k ≤ 1 + γ to be met); (ii) it increases the degree of com-
petition between hospitals, by decreasing their heterogeneity, so that
it leads to lower allocative distortions in the market for health
professionals.
Going into detail of the allocative distortions characterising equi-
librium contracts, different situations emerge according to the
magnitude of k, which governs the for-profit hospital’s regimes, and
according to the relative magnitudes of γ and Δθ, that influence the
states of the world in which the non-profit hospital can find itself.
The reader, who is not interested in contract details and binding con-
straints, might want to skip the following subsections and go directly
to Section 5.
4.3.1. Mild competition
This situation corresponds to point (i) in Proposition 2. It occurs
when k is sufficiently high (close to 1 + γ) and also when γ is not
too low, so that each hospital has a sizeable competitive advan-
tage with respect to the rival.
• The for-profit hospital is in Regime 1 (irrelevance of outside
options). Low-ability workers are indifferent between hospi-
tals, i.e. PCamFP is binding; as for internal incentive compatibility,
high-ability workers are indifferent between accepting their con-
tract or the contract designed for low-ability health professionals,
i.e. constraint ICAvsaFP is binding. The for-profit hospital sets second-
best effort levels.
• The non-profit hospital is in Case M: optimal effort levels are
such that e e e eAMNP aMNP AmNP amNP> > = and a pooling contract is offered
out-of-equilibrium to non-motivated types. Worker am is just
indifferent between hospitals, i.e. PCamNP is binding, and
e e eAmNP amNP amFB NP= = , . Worker Am, despite being offered the same con-
tract as worker am, is strictly better-off than am because of her
lower effort cost. Still, worker Am strictly prefers to be em-
ployed by hospital FP and thus PCAmNP is slack. Motivated workers
are given a contract such that worker aM is made indifferent
between her contract and the pooling contract proposed to non-
motivated workers, and worker AM is made indifferent between
her contract and type aM’s contract. Hence, motivated types are
required to make second-best efforts.
4.3.2. Harsh competition
This situation corresponds to point (ii) in Proposition 2. It is in
place when k is low (i.e. close to 1) and when γ is also low (i.e. lower
than Δθ), so that no hospital has a significant competitive advan-
tage with respect to the rival.
• The for-profit hospital is in Regime 3, with both participation
constraints of non-motivated types being binding. Thus, both
high- and low-ability workers are indifferent between the two
hospitals. Moreover, all incentives constraints are slack, so that
there is no envy betweenworkers with different skills. Then, first-
best effort levels are set for all workers by the for-profit hospital.
• The non-profit hospital is in Case A : optimal effort levels are
such that e e e eAMNP AmNP aMNP amNP> > > . Since participation constraints of
non-motivated health professionals are binding, the non-profit
hospital offers these types their first-best total surplus utilities
UAm
TS NP, and UamTS NP, and asks them to provide first-best effort
levels. Worker AM is indifferent between her contract and the
contract offered to type Am, whereas worker aM is indifferent
between her contract and the contract offered to either type Am
or type am. In any event, since no other type of worker is trying
to mimic them, motivated types AM and aM are asked to provide
first-best effort levels.
4.3.3. Intermediate degrees of competition
All remaining situations encompassed by point (iii) in Proposi-
tion 2 refer to intermediate degrees of competition between
hospitals. Then, all remaining combinations among Regimes 2 or
3 for the for-profit hospital and Cases A or M or P for the non-
profit hospital can occur.
A characteristic feature of all these cases is that both participa-
tion constraints of non-motivated types are binding for the for-
profit hospital, as under harsh competition. Then, the non-profit
hospital offers workers Am and am their first-best total surplus utili-
ties UAm
TS NP, and UamTS NP, and requires first-best effort levels from these
types. Finally, the non-profit hospital chooses its optimal con-
tracts according to the relative magnitudes of γ and Δθ, which
determine whether motivation or ability prevails.32
5. Ownership structure and performance
In this section, we will consider the impact that the hospitals’
ownership structure has on their performance, measured both in
terms of quality of care provided to their patients and in terms of
rewards offered to their health professionals.
5.1. Quality of care
Up to now, we focused on how competition affects distortions
in optimal allocations, interpreting literally our contracting instru-
ment in terms of effort. Nonetheless, even more relevant from a
policy perspective is the interpretation of the contracting variable
in terms of quality of care. Indeed, a hotly debated issue in health
economics is whether non-profit hospitals offer higher quality with
respect to for-profit ones. Our model provides the following inter-
esting insights.
30 See Footnote 4.
31 See also the Concluding remarks.
32 More precisely, the non-profit hospital is in Case P when γ is intermediate (i.e.
higher than Δθ but not close to 1). Intermediate types’ effort levels are pooled and
e e e e eAMNP aMNP AmNP Am
FB NP
am
NP> = = >, . Worker AM is indifferent between her contract and the
pooling contract, and she gets the first-best. The effort for worker aM is in-
between the first- and the second-best. Alternatively, the non-profit hospital is in
Case Mwhen γ is high (i.e. higher than Δθ and close to 1). Optimal effort levels are
such that e e e eAMNP aMNP AmNP amNP> > > . As under mild competition, worker aM is made in-
different between her contract and the first-best total surplus contract proposed to
worker Am, and worker AM is made indifferent between her contract and type aM’s
contract. Hence, motivated types are required to make second-best efforts. Finally,
the for-profit hospital is in Regime 2 when k is intermediate (i.e. neither close to 1
nor to 1 + γ). High-ability types are indifferent between their contract and the con-
tract targeted to low-ability colleagues. Thus, high-ability workers are given by the
for-profit hospital their first-best allocation and effort of low-ability workers is dis-
torted downward but less than at the second-best.
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Proposition 3. Quality differentials
Given ability, health professionals employed at the non-profit hos-
pital almost always deliver higher quality of care than colleagues
employed at the for-profit hospital.
Proof. It follows directly from inspection of the optimal alloca-
tions derived in Appendix S1(E). ■
The intuition for this result is the following. Recall that sorting
is ability-neutral, so that (with independent distributions of workers’
characteristics) average ability is the same for both hospitals’ work-
force; moreover, motivated workers hired by the non-profit hospital
partly donate their quality-enhancing effort, thus improving their
employer’s performance.
There is a unique exception to the previous result, which only
refers to low-ability types, and which occurs when the non-profit
hospital has a high competitive advantage whereas the competi-
tive advantage of the for-profit hospital is low, or when the degree
of competition is intermediate, motivation prevails for the non-
profit hospital and the for-profit hospital is in Regime 3 (see
Subsection 4.3.3). In this case, the for-profit hospital does not distort
quality provided by low-ability non-motivated workers, whereas the
non-profit hospital distorts the quality provided by low-ability mo-
tivated workers downward to save in information rents.
The results in Proposition 3 are coherent with those of the formal
theory explaining the existence of non-profit organizations by con-
tractual incompleteness (see Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001; Hansmann,
1996) and according to which non-profits’ weak incentives to maxi-
mize profits act as a commitment device, assuring customers that
quality will be high.
As for the empirical literature analyzing the correlation between
quality and ownership structure, our results are in line with the
studies documenting higher quality for non-profit hospitals.33
Eggleston et al. (2008) find that the effect of hospital ownership
on quality in the U.S. depends mainly on the institutional context,
including differences across regions, markets, and over time. The
authors conclude that non-profit ownership appears to be system-
atically related to higher quality among hospitals in several contexts.
Shen (2002) examines the effect of U.S. hospitals’ ownership
choice on patients’ outcomes after treatment for myocardial in-
farction and finds that for-profit and government hospitals have
higher incidence of adverse outcomes than non-profit hospitals
by 3–4%. This is interpreted as strong evidence that for-profit
hospitals produce worse health outcomes than non-profit hospi-
tals. Lien et al. (2008) find that patients admitted to non-profit
hospitals in Taiwan receive better quality care measured by mor-
tality rates. Finally, studying the nursing home market in the U.S.,
Hillmer et al. (2005) and Grabowski and Hirth (2003) offer evi-
dence that quality is higher in the non-profit sector. Such result
has been recently confirmed by Jones (2015). Analyzing the market
for nursing homes in the U.S. as well, he documents that the
quality of non-profit work is highest when non-profit labour
demand is low relative to for-profit (i.e. when the non-profit
share of labour in a given locality is low).
5.2. Wage differentials and returns to ability
In this section, we compare the wage schemes offered by the two
hospitals when they coexist and workers sort themselves accord-
ing to motivation, i.e. when 1 < k ≤ 1 + γ. In particular, it is interesting
to consider the model’s predictions as for the wage differential, if
any, between the non-profit and the for-profit hospital.34 We first
compare the wage rate offered by the two hospitals to motivated
and non-motivated workers, fixing the level of ability. Then, we
compare the returns to ability across hospitals, that is we consider
the wage increase that health professionals hired by a given hos-
pital receive in response to an increase in their level of ability.35
For a wide range of parameter configurations, it can be shown
that
w w wAMNP AMFP AmFP< = , (7)
and also that
w w waMNP aMFP amFP< = . (8)
These results hold when the competitive advantage of the for-
profit hospital is sufficiently higher than the competitive advantage
of the non-profit hospital. Inequalities (7) and (8) hold under mild
competition, provided that k is sufficiently high (see Subsection 4.3.1),
or when the degree of competition is intermediate, in particular
when ability prevails for the non-profit hospital (i.e. γ is low) and
k is still sufficiently high (see Subsection 4.3.3). The intuition is the
following: under mild competition and when the non-profit hos-
pital offers out-of-equilibrium a pooling contract to non-motivated
types, or when the degree of competition is intermediate and ability
prevails for the non-profit hospital, then motivated agents do not
cumulate large information rents because they are unable to mimic
many other types of workers. These health professionals are thus
offered lowwages. This fact depresses the left-hand side of the above
inequalities. On the other hand, when k is sufficiently high, the for-
profit hospital has an important advantage in terms of revenue
appropriation and this increases the wages that it is able to pay, thus
raising the right-hand side of the above inequalities.
Importantly, given that average ability is the same for both hos-
pitals (see Corollary 1), a wage gap represents a true compensating
wage differential between the two hospitals because it is entirely
driven by intrinsic motivation and does not depend on differences
in workers’ ability. However, ability does matter because inequal-
ity (7) is easier to be satisfied than inequality (8). Moreover, not only
is the wage penalty larger for high-ability workers than for low-
ability employees, but it might also be the case that the wage penalty
exists for high-ability types but not for low-ability workers.36 Hence,
equally skilled workers provide higher effort, which translates into
higher quality, when hired by the non-profit hospital that offers lower
wage rates (see Proposition 3).37
Therefore, when a non-profit wage penalty is observed for mo-
tivated workers, it is increasing in ability. This fact has immediate
implications for the returns to ability provided by the two hospi-
tals. Let us then consider the difference between the returns to ability
for workers hired by the non-profit hospital, i.e. w wAMNP aMNP− , and the
returns to ability for workers hired by the for-profit hospital, i.e.
w wAmFP amFP− . In particular, if
33 As mentioned in the Introduction, the empirical evidence concerning the rela-
tionship between hospital status and quality provision is rather mixed. See, for
example, the literature review in Brekke et al. (2012).
34 Our framework is particularly appropriate to study the wage differential because
out-of-equilibrium contracts allow to compare the salary offered to the same worker
by the different hospitals.
35 This concept bears some similarity to the power of incentives studied in moral
hazard frameworks (see Besley and Ghatak, 2005, where it is suggested that mission-
oriented firms offer low-powered incentives to their employees, and Ghatak and
Mueller, 2011) and transposed in an adverse selection framework by Delfgaauw and
Dur (2008), Makris (2009), and Makris and Siciliani (2014).
36 This is in line with some empirical findings in the wage comparison of non-
profit and for-profit firms (see Preston, 1989). Relative to hospitals, the fact that the
non-profit wage penalty is higher for managers and top executives with respect to
lower levels in the hierarchy is documented by Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999).
37 However, this is not sufficient to generate higher profits for the non-profit hos-
pital because its propensity to appropriate revenues is inferior to that of the for-
profit hospital.
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w w w wAMNP aMNP AmFP amFP− < −
holds, then, in equilibrium, the gain from increased ability is lower
for non-profit workers. Importantly, our model shows that, when
the non-profit wage penalty exists, the non-profit hospital also pro-
vides lower returns to ability relative to the for-profit rival.
The Proposition that follows fixes the main ideas illustrated in
this subsection.
Proposition 4. Compensating wage differentials and returns to
ability
When the competitive advantage of the for-profit hospital is suffi-
ciently higher than that of the non-profit hospital, then: (i) a non-
profit wage penalty exists: given ability, health professionals employed
at the non-profit hospital earn less (while exerting more effort) than
what they would gain if employed at the for-profit hospital; (ii) the non-
profit hospital provides its employees with lower returns to ability
relative to the for-profit hospital.
Proof. See Appendix S1(F). ■
Conversely, a non-profit wage premium is observed when the
competitive advantage of the for-profit hospital is low relative to
the one of the non-profit hospital (in particular, when k is suffi-
ciently low and γ is high, namely under intermediate levels of
competition with motivation prevailing for the non-profit hospi-
tal). This is due to the fact that the non-profit hospital must give
high information rents to motivated workers to elicit their private
information. And this translates into high wages offered by the non-
profit hospital.38
To conclude, our model can accommodate both the empirical ev-
idence showing the existence of a wage penalty for workers
employed at non-profit firms, and the evidence of a wage premium
for non-profit workers. Focusing on the health care market in the
U.S., Borjas et al. (1983) and Holtmann and Idson (1993) docu-
ment higher wages in non-profit nursing homes than in for-profit
ones, although results are only slightly significant. Also James (2002)
shows that, on average, wages are higher in non-profit hospitals than
in for-profit ones. Conversely, Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) find
higher pay in for-profit than in non-profit hospitals. Finally, Jones
(2015) finds that non-profit wage penalties exist in the U.S. nursing
home industry when the non-profit share of labour demand is low.
He also reports suggestive evidence that non-profit workers facing
the largest wage gaps (and producing the highest quality work, as
mentioned in the previous subsection) are also most likely to have
high job satisfaction.
6. Concluding remarks
We analyze amodel in which the non-profitmission (for example
providing charity care) generates a non-monetary benefit that mo-
tivated health professionals enjoywhen they exert quality-enhancing
effort and contribute to the non-profit hospital’s provision of care.
The interaction between a non-profit hospital and amotivated health
professional increases the total surplus that an employer-employee
pair can obtain. Such an additional surplus comes with a cost
because, by being non-profit, the hospital sacrifices some of its
revenues.
The model’s results crucially depend on the relative magni-
tudes of the competitive advantage of the for-profit hospital with
respect to the non-profit one in terms of revenue appropriation,
i.e. k − 1, and of the benefit that the non-profit hospital derives
frommotivated workers’ labour donations, i.e. γ. Here, we comment
on the different economic scenarios (i.e. k lower or higher than
1 + γ) described in the paper and provide some policy implica-
tions. Although hospitals’ differentiation according to their
organizational form is exogenously given in our framework, the
model is sufficiently rich to accommodate for alternative market
structures.
Suppose first that the two hospitals have the same for-profit
status: in our model, this corresponds to the case in which both hos-
pitals fully appropriate their revenues and k kFP NP= . Notice that
motivated workers would not obtain their ‘vocational’ premium and
no hospital would benefit from labour donations. The two hospi-
tals would be identical and competition would be so tough as to
drive profits to zero. Acquiring the non-profit status and, for in-
stance, adhering to the mission of providing care to the poor and
uninsured, would allow a hospital to obtain positive profits from
motivated health professionals. Thus, the mission-orientation of the
non-profit hospital could provide a way out of the Bertrand paradox
and could serve the same goal as firms’ horizontal product differ-
entiation, the distinction being that the non-profit status increases
workers’ willingness to accept lower wages, whereas product dif-
ferentiation increases the consumers’ willingness to pay for goods
or services.
In sectors where non-profit firms operate, they tend to coexist
with for-profit firms (see Rose-Ackerman, 1996). In this respect, our
model predicts that a non-profit hospital can survive in a market
populated by for-profit competitors as long as the benefit from at-
tracting motivated health professionals is sufficiently high and/or
the competitive advantage of the for-profit hospital is sufficiently
low, i.e. as long as 1 < k ≤ 1 + γ. This is the most interesting situa-
tion, in which the non-profit and the for-profit hospitals compete
to attract the best health professionals, and workers sort accord-
ing to motivation. Coherent with this prediction of the model is the
observation that non-profit firms abound in the health care and ed-
ucation sector where collective goods and services, which matter
for motivated workers, are provided.
Finally, consider the instance in which the for-profit hospital’s
competitive advantage is very high relative to the non-profit’s,
whereby k > 1 + γ. Then, only the for-profit firm is active in the
market, while the non-profit hospital is a potential entrant. Recall,
however, that the coexistence of non-profit and for-profit hospi-
tals is welfare-improving for two reasons: first because of the
additional surplus generated by the matching of the non-profit
firm and motivated workers, second because competition reduces
allocative distortions. The latter decrease even more when com-
petition is intense. Therefore, the participation of non-profit hospitals
in the market for health care provision should be encouraged.
This could be accomplished, for example, if the government sets a
sufficiently low mandatory charity care standard for non-profit
hospitals. Not only would this make k fall below 1 + γ and help
restore market segmentation, but it would also increase allocative
efficiency.
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Appendix: Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.003.
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